Remedying abuses of limited liability in company groups by Smit, Anina
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
1 
 
 
 
REMEDYING ABUSES OF LIMITED LIABILITY IN COMPANY GROUPS 
 
Minor Dissertation  
in completion of Master’s degree specialising in Commercial Law 
 
 
 
Anina Smit 
SMTANI002 
 
 
Supervised by Helena Stoop 
 
[24 781 words] 
 
 
 
 
Research dissertation presented for the approval of Senate in fulfillment of part of 
the requirements for the Master of Laws in approved courses and a minor 
dissertation/ research paper.  The other part of the requirement for this qualification 
was the completion of a programme of courses. 
 
I [by submitting this research dissertation electronically] hereby declare that I have 
read and understood the regulations governing the submission of Master of Laws 
dissertations papers, including those relating to length and plagiarism, as contained 
in the rules of this University, and that this dissertation/ research paper conforms to 
those regulations. 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REMEDYING ABUSES OF LIMITED LIABILITY IN COMPANY GROUPS 
3 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Cape Plc was an English company in the business of mining and marketing 
asbestos. The company operated its international footprint through incorporating 
subsidiaries in other jurisdictions where it wished to do business. One such 
subsidiary was incorporated in Texas. The employees of the Texan company 
became ill with asbestosis and instituted action against Cape Plc and its subsidiaries 
in Texas. Judgment was awarded against the holding company and its subsidiary for 
breach of duty of care owing to its employees.  Cape Plc however liquidated the 
Texan subsidiary; all its assets were consequently sold and it ceased doing 
business. The only chance the plaintiffs had to recover damages was to enforce the 
judgment in England against the holding company. The English court however 
refused to do so and strictly upheld the separate legal personality of the holding 
company.1 The holding company could therefore not be held liable for the delicts of 
its subsidiaries and the claimants were left with no entity to enforce their judgment 
against; whilst the holding company was free to continue operating. 
 
This case demonstrates the concerns that are often raised with regards to company 
groups. A holding company can incorporate a number of subsidiary companies and 
exercise complete control over them, but the law will still recognise those 
subsidiaries as individual, independent companies.2   
 
This thesis will explore the origins of the separate legal personality of the company 
and the development of the default rule of limited liability of the shareholders of the 
company. The author will discuss the policy considerations in support of the limited 
liability of shareholders and investigate how this default rule came to be applicable 
also to individual companies within a company group; functioning as a single 
economic entity. The research will show some of the abuses of these principals and 
possibly unintended consequences of extending separate legal personality and 
                                                           
1
 Adams v Cape Industries Plc 1991 1 All ER 929. 
2
 Adams v Cape Industries Plc supra (n1). 
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limited liability to companies operating within a group.  The author will then in turn 
discuss the remedies which the courts have used to address these abuses by 
disregarding the separate legal personalities of companies within a group. The 
research will first discuss the common law remedy for piercing of the corporate veil, 
and then the statutory remedy under section 20(9) of the South African Companies 
Act3 (the Act). 
 
A pertinent question which the author will seek to address is whether piercing the 
corporate veil under common law is an efficient remedy by which concerns in 
corporate groups can be addressed. If this is not the case, consideration will be 
given as to whether the legislative developments have reformed the law in this 
regard and now provide a sufficient mechanism by which the concerns in company 
groups can be remedied. The research will consider the position under South African 
law with reference to the position in other jurisdictions. The purpose of the 
comparison is to inform the research against the position in other jurisdictions as the 
South African judiciary and policy makers often turn to the position in other 
jurisdictions in coming to a decision or formulating policy.4   
 
Throughout this paper, certain assumptions will be used with regards to the meaning 
of a company group and the research will focus on piercing the corporate veil as a 
remedy. A preliminary discussion of these two concepts is therefore necessary. 
 
WHAT IS A GROUP? 
 
Under Section 1 of the Act, a group of companies is defined to mean ‘a holding 
company and all of its subsidiaries.’ A holding company, in relation to a subsidiary, 
means a juristic person, one or more other subsidiaries of that juristic person, or one 
or more nominees of that juristic person or any of its subsidiaries, alone or in any 
                                                           
3
 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
4
 See for example subsection 5(2) of the Act. 
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combination, which controls that subsidiary as a result of the following 
circumstances: 
 
• The company is directly or indirectly able to exercise or control the exercise 
of a majority of the voting rights associated with securities in that company, 
whether pursuant to a shareholder agreement or otherwise;5  
 
• The company has the right to appoint or elect, or control the appointment or 
election of, directors of that company who control a majority of the votes at a 
meeting of the board;6 or 
 
• The company holds or controls, alone or in any combination, all the general 
voting rights associated with issued securities in that company; in which case 
that company is a wholly owned subsidiary of another juristic person.7 
 
Section 2(2) of the Act describes when a person would be considered exercising 
control over a juristic person. This section reads as follows: 
 
‘For the purpose of subsection (1), a person controls a juristic person, or its     
business, if— 
(a) in the case of a juristic person that is a company— 
(i) that juristic person is a subsidiary of that first person, as determined in 
accordance with section 3 (1) (a); or 
(ii) that first person together with any related or inter-related person, is— 
(aa) directly or indirectly able to exercise or control the exercise of a 
majority of the voting rights associated with securities of that 
company, whether pursuant to a shareholder agreement or 
otherwise; or 
                                                           
5
 Section 1, read together with subsection 2(2)(a) and subsection 3(1)(a)(i), of the Act. 
6
 Section 1, read together with subsection 2(2)(a) and subsection 3(1)(a)(ii), of the Act.  
7
 Section 3(1)(b) of the Act. 
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(bb) has the right to appoint or elect, or control the appointment or 
election of, directors of that company who control a majority of the 
votes at a meeting of the board; 
 
(b) in the case of a juristic person that is a close corporation, that first person 
owns the majority of the members’ interest, or controls directly, or has the 
right to control, the majority of members’ votes in the close corporation; 
 
(c) in the case of a juristic person that is a trust, that first person has the 
ability to control the majority of the votes of the trustees or to appoint the 
majority of the trustees, or to appoint or change the majority of the 
beneficiaries of the trust; or 
 
(d) that first person has the ability to materially influence the policy of the 
juristic person in a manner comparable to a person who, in ordinary 
commercial practice, would be able to exercise an element of control referred 
to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).’ 
 
A further implication for group structures is the concepts of related and inter-related 
persons. 
 
‘For all purposes of this Act— 
(a) an individual is related to another individual if they— 
(i) are married, or live together in a relationship similar to a marriage; or 
(ii) are separated by no more than two degrees of natural or adopted 
consanguinity or affinity; 
 
(b) an individual is related to a juristic person if the individual directly or 
indirectly controls the juristic person, as determined in accordance with 
subsection (2); and 
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(c) a juristic person is related to another juristic person if— 
(i) either of them directly or indirectly controls the other, or the business 
of the other, as determined in accordance with subsection (2); 
(ii) either is a subsidiary of the other; or 
(iii) a person directly or indirectly controls each of them, or the business 
of each of them, as determined in accordance with subsection (2).’8 
 
From the above definitions and provisions, it is apparent that in terms of the Act the 
holding/subsidiary relationship is based on control.9 The concept of a group of 
companies, being defined as a holding company and its subsidiaries, therefore 
essentially arises when there is control by one company over the other.  
 
This thesis will therefore consider a company group to be limited to a group 
consisting of a holding company which can exercise control over a subsidiary 
company. This control can either be established by the ability to exercise or control 
the exercise of voting rights in the subsidiary or the ability to appoint the directors 
who control a majority of the votes at board meetings. The importance of this is that 
the remedy for piercing the corporate veil, as will appear from the discussion in 
Chapter 3, is only available where a shareholder, whether a natural or juristic 
person, is able to control a company. As will appear from the discussion in Chapter 
2, abuses within company groups are also more prominent where the holding 
company controls the subsidiary. 
 
PIERCING vs LIFTING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
 
There is a long standing academic debate on the difference between piercing and 
lifting of the corporate veil.10 
 
                                                           
8
 Subsection 2(1) of the Act. 
9
 FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) at 200. 
10
 Ex Parte Gore NNO 2013 2 All SA 437 at 4. 
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The term ‘piercing’ is often used to describe both lifting of the veil and actual piercing 
of the veil. These concepts are however distinguishable. In Atlas Marine Co SA v 
Avalon Maritime Ltd, The Coral Rose (No 1)11 the court explained this distinction as 
follows: 
 
‘To pierce the corporate veil is an expression that I would reserve for treating 
the rights or liabilities or activities of a company as the rights or liabilities or 
activities of its shareholders. To lift the corporate veil or look behind it, on the 
other hand, should mean to have regard to the shareholding in a company (in 
other words, to its controllers) for some legal purposes.’12 
 
Lifting of the corporate veil, also referred to as ‘looking behind the veil’, occurs when 
the court seeks to establish some fact about the shareholders, or the persons who 
controls the company, because of its relevance in law. Cassim13 discusses, as an 
example of lifting the corporate veil, the case of Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre 
and Rubber Co.14 In this case a company, incorporated in England with the purpose 
of selling in England tyres made in Germany, instituted action against a debtor for 
payment of trade debt. At this time, England and Germany was at war and the 
debtor raised the defense that it could not pay the debt because it would result in it 
trading with the enemy. In this regard, it argued that Daimler Co, although 
incorporated in England, was in fact an alien company because all the directors and 
shareholders (except one) were German nationals. The court said that in order to 
determine whether the company was an enemy or not, it had to look at whether the 
persons in de facto control of the company was resident in an enemy country.  The 
court found that even though the company was incorporated in England, it must look 
behind this veil and determine where the de facto controllers of the company were 
resident. Where the company had been taking instructions from the controllers, 
resident in the enemy state, the company would also be regarded as an enemy 
                                                           
11
 Atlas Marine Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd (No 1) 1991 4 All ER 769. 
12
 Atlas Marine Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd (No 1) supra (n 11) at 779. 
13
 FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2012) 46. 
14
 Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co 1961 2 AC 307. 
9 
 
company. Although finding that the company was an enemy company because of its 
owners and decision makers being German, the court did not disregard the 
company’s separate legal personality. 
 
When the court lifts the veil it is merely considering who the directors and 
shareholders of the company are. It does not mean that the court will ignore the 
separate legal personality of the company or that the court will treat the company’s 
liabilities as those of the directors and shareholders.15  
 
Piercing the corporate veil, on the other hand, refers to those cases in which the 
court disregards the separate legal personality of the relevant company in the matter 
at hand. Where the court disregards the separate legal personality of the company it 
treats its shareholders, or those in control of the company, as if they had been acting 
in partnership; or where there is only a single shareholder who is also the director, 
as if he or she had acted on his or her own behalf. The consequence of piercing 
would therefore be that the assets and liabilities of the company become those of 
the shareholders or controllers personally.  
 
In Ex Parte Gore16 the court states that ‘a broad consideration of the case law in 
several jurisdictions impels the conclusion that nothing really turns on the labels 
despite the documented debate therein about the nuances in the terminology.’17 In 
other words, the question of whether the court is ‘piercing’ or ‘lifting’ the veil is an 
academic debate; the courts have used both terms to describe the remedy provided 
where the courts disregarded some or all of characteristics of a company’s separate 
legal personality. 
 
 
 
                                                           
15
 FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2012) 46. 
16
 Ex Parte Gore NNO 2013 supra (n 10). 
17
 Ex Parte Gore NNO 2013 supra (n 10) at 4. 
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For purposes of this paper, the distinction is not of consequence. The focus of this 
paper will be on providing a remedy whereby liability is placed on a holding company 
as a result of its subsidiary’s separate legal personality being discarded. The 
essence of a remedy would lie in the ability to hold a holding company liable for the 
obligations of its subsidiaries.  
11 
 
CHAPTER TWO: THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATE LEGAL PERSONALITY AND 
LIMITED LIABILITY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 ‘The foundation of company law rests on the concept that a company has a 
separate legal personality.’18 
 
Separate legal personality means that the company is able to obtain rights and incur 
liabilities in its own right, separate from its shareholders.19 The profits of the 
company belong not to its shareholders, but to the company itself.20 Shareholders 
can only share in profits if the company declares dividends.21 Also, the juristic 
person enjoys perpetuity and survives the passing of its shareholders or any other 
change in shareholding.22  
 
One further consequence that may follow from a company’s separate persona is that 
the shareholders of the company have limited liability when it comes to the debts 
and obligations of the company.23 This is however up to the shareholders, and they 
may choose to arrange the liability of the company differently, by for example 
incorporating a personal liability company.24 
 
Most companies are however incorporated with limited liability, and this is the default 
rule under the Act.25 Limited liability means that in the event that the company falters 
                                                           
18
 FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2012) 29. 
19
 Section 19(1)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008; R Pennington Pennignton’s Company Law 4ed (1979) 1. 
20
 FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2012) 36. 
21
 FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2012) 36. 
22
 Section 19(1)(a) of the Act; FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2012) 36. 
23
 Section 19(2) of the Act. 
24
 In terms of Section 8(2)(c) of the Act a company will be a personal liability company if its Memorandum of 
Incorporation determines so. 
25
 Section 19(2) of the Act determines that an incorporator, shareholder or director of a company is not solely liable 
for any liabilities or obligations of the company expect to the extent that the Companies Act or the companies 
Memorandum of Incorporation determines otherwise. FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2012) 35; 
Section 19(2) of the Act. 
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and is unable to pay its debts, the liability of its incorporators would be limited to the 
amount invested in the company in terms of their shareholding. If the company is 
liquidated, the shareholders cannot be held liable for the debts of the company. 
Conversely, if the company’s shareholders are sequestrated, it will not lead to the 
liquidation of the company.   
 
DEVELOPMENT OF LIMITED LIABILITY AS THE DEFAULT RULE 
 
The idea that a collective group can act on its own behalf can be traced back to the 
early Roman Empire when at least one third of the population belonged to 
professional colleges called collegia, corpora, societates, sodalitates, or sodalicia.26 
As far back as Roman times, there was at least a desire for groups to operate 
together and promote the economic and commercial interests of their members in 
order to safeguard economic privileges, control markets and have influence over 
prices.27 Roman laws affecting the recognition of collegia were interchangeable and 
dependent on the whim of those in power.28 Limited liability was not applicable to the 
collegia, although one form of limited liability that existed in Roman law was that of 
the paterfamilias, whose liability extended only to the debts of his employees to the 
amount entrusted to that employee.29 
 
In medieval England, continental guilds were the common form through which 
individuals established trade organisations.30 These guilds confined themselves to 
the disciplines of their members and provided them with assistance to trade with 
outsiders.31 Guilds were occasionally granted charters by the Crown or authority of 
                                                           
26
 D Figueroa ‘Comparative Aspects of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States and Latin America’ (2012) 
(2012) Vol 50 Duquesne Law Review 683 at 689. 
27
 D Figueroa ‘Comparative Aspects of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States and Latin America’ (2012) 
689. 
28
 D Figueroa ‘Comparative Aspects of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States and Latin America’ (2012) 
690. 
29
 D Figueroa ‘Comparative Aspects of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States and Latin America’ (2012) 
696. 
30
 R Pennington Pennington’s Company Law (1979) 5. 
31
 R Pennington Pennington’s Company Law (1979) 6. 
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parliament which enabled the members to obtain a monopoly over a specific 
discipline or trade.32   
 
The name ‘company’ was first given to merchant traders who conducted trade 
abroad by virtue of charters granted by the Crown.33 These companies were mostly 
extensions of the earlier guilds.34 A company traded on behalf of its members, each 
member contributing towards the merchandise that was to be sold in a foreign 
country, and taking a proportionate share in the profits.35 Charters and monopoly 
status over an area of trade or territory usually co-existed.36 As a result, great state-
owned corporations emerged, among them the British East India Company, which 
under its charter had exclusive right to trade in the Indies.37 Although at inception the 
individual members of the East India Company conducted trade for their individual 
interest, later members were, in addition to their own interest, allowed to subscribe 
to a joint stock under the control of the company. A joint pool of assets and profits 
were then distributed after completion of a voyage.38  
 
In the later part of the 17th century, this form of arranging trade became known as 
joint stock trading and by the end of the 17th century, all companies of merchant 
traders had established permanent fixed capitals, represented by shares which were 
freely transferable, and the capital was placed under the exclusive control of their 
boards.39 
 
                                                           
32
 R Pennington Pennington’s Company Law (1979) 6. 
33
 RA Stevens The External Relations of Company Groups in South African Law: A Critical Comparative Analysis LLD 
(University of Stellenbosch) (2011) 23. 
34
 D Figueroa ‘Comparative Aspects of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States and Latin America’ (2012) 694 
35
 R Pennington Pennington’s Company Law (1979) 6. 
36
 D Figueroa ‘Comparative Aspects of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States and Latin America’ (2012) 
695; RA Stevens The External Relations of Company Groups in South African Law (2011) 23 
37
 D Figueroa ‘Comparative Aspects of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States and Latin America’ (2012) 
695; RA Stevens The External Relations of Company Groups in South African Law (2011) 24.  
38
 W S Holdsworth ‘The Early History of Commercial Societies Juridical Review’ (1916) 28 Jurid. Rev. 305 (1916) 
at 323 - 324 
39
 R Pennington Pennington’s Company Law (1979) 6. 
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Although charters were essential in obtaining a monopoly in respect of foreign trade, 
charters were not easily or cheaply obtainable.40 Consequently, many companies 
were formed without incorporation and simply established partnerships, the terms of 
the partnership agreement (later called deeds of settlement) mimicking the terms 
generally contained in charters.41 Other traders purchased charters from struggling 
companies and carried on their own business under this company’s name.42  
 
As a result of this unregulated trade, in 1720 parliament passed the Bubble Act.43 
Under the Bubble Act, the establishment of corporations except by act of parliament 
or royal charter was prohibited. There are, however, those who propose that the 
Bubble Act was introduced to protect the wealth of the South Sea Company.44 The 
South Sea Company, originally given a monopoly over trade in the Spanish South 
American colonies, had acquired the whole of the national debt of England.45 It was 
said that the Bubble Act was enacted to benefit investment in the South Sea 
Company by suppressing other companies.46 Stock prices in the South Sea 
Company were initially over-promoted by directors and as investor sentiment fell, as 
an unintended consequence of the Bubble Act, stock prices fell to a fraction of their 
worth.47 In 1925, the Bubble Act was repealed and in 1944, replaced with the Joint 
Stock Companies Act. The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1944 was the first to allow 
incorporation of a company under general enabling legislation.48 The act still 
however did not provide for limited liability.49  
 
                                                           
40
 R Pennington Pennington’s Company Law (1979) 6. 
41
 R Pennington Pennington’s Company Law (1979) 6. 
42
 R Pennington Pennington’s Company Law (1979) 6. 
43
 RA Stevens The External Relations of Company Groups in South African Law (2011) 27. 
44
 R Pennington Pennington’s Company Law (1979) 7. 
45
 RA Stevens The External Relations of Company Groups in South African Law (2011) 26. 
46
 R Pennington Pennington’s Company Law (1979) 7. 
47
 R Pennington Pennington’s Company Law (1979) 7. 
48
 ML Djelic ‘When Limited Liability was (Still) an Issue: Mobilization and Politics of Signification in 19th Century 
England’ (2013) 35(5-6) Organization Studies 567 at 601; RA Stevens The External Relations of Company Groups in 
South African Law (2011) 29. 
49
 PI Blumberg ‘Limited Liability and Corporate Groups’ (1985 – 1986) 11 Journal for Corporation Law 573 at 584. 
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The political debate at the time was on the one side cautious of the bitter public 
sentiment towards limited liability as a result of corporate failures such as the South 
Sea Company and the belief that limited liability would enable further speculation 
and fraudulent inflation of values and therefore lead to uneconomic promotions.50 On 
the other hand, it was critised by those who argued that limited liability was essential 
for accumulation of the substantial capital investment required by the growing 
industrial order.51  
 
The Depression of 1845-1848 and public acceptance of limited liability for railways 
finally tipped the scale in favour of limited liability.52 The railway industry was one of 
the most successful industries in England and needed large amounts of capital 
investment but with very little investor involvement.53 As a result of the separation 
between management and investors, few questioned limiting investors’ exposure to 
delictual liability.54 In 1855, the Limited Liability Act finally brought to life what may be 
the source of the modern day limited liability corporation. This act, although 
accepting the unlimited liability of the members, gave effect to the machinery which 
would enable members to limit their liability to the amount due by members in 
accordance with their share.55 The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 consolidated 
the former two pieces of legislation and resulted therein that two forms of companies 
could be established, the limited and the unlimited company.56 The Companies Act 
of 1867 confirmed the principle of limited liability, and continued the trend that 
ultimately lead to limited liability of shareholders being accepted as the default rule in 
English company law.57 
                                                           
50
 PI Blumberg ‘Limited Liability and Corporate Groups’ (1985 – 1986) 584. 
51
 PI Blumberg ‘Limited Liability and Corporate Groups’ (1985 – 1986) 584. 
52
 PI Blumberg ‘Limited Liability and Corporate Groups’ (1985 – 1986) 584. 
53
 PI Blumberg ‘Limited Liability and Corporate Groups’ (1985 – 1986) 584. 
54
 PI Blumberg ‘Limited Liability and Corporate Groups’ (1985 – 1986) 584. 
55
 HS Cilliers and ML Benade et al Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 21. 
56
 HS Cilliers and ML Benade et al Corporate Law (2000) 21. 
57
 D Figueroa ‘Comparative Aspects of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States and Latin America’ (2012) 
698. 
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In the late 1890’s the landmark case of Solomon v Solomon and Co Ltd58 cemented 
both separate legal personality and limited liability in English company law. The 
famous facts in the Solomon case were briefly that Mr. Solomon was a leather 
merchant, trading as a sole trader for many years. At a later stage, he however felt 
the need to secure the benefits of perpetual succession and limited liability59 and 
decided to establish a company to which he sold the business. The company had a 
share capital of 40 000 shares with a nominal value of £1. He, his wife, daughter and 
four sons each subscribed for one share. The payment of the purchase price of 
£39000 was structured to be made as a partial cash payment of £9000, the issuing 
of 20 000 fully paid shares to Mr. Solomon, and by further issuing debentures to Mr. 
Solomon for the remaining £10 000. The idea was that the company would remain a 
family business. Mr. Solomon was the controlling shareholder, holding 20 001 of the 
20 007 issued shares. He was also a director and an employee of the company. 
Unfortunately, the business deteriorated and eventually had to be liquidated. During 
the liquidation proceedings, it became apparent that if Mr. Solomon were to be paid 
the value of his debentures, there would be no funds left to pay the company’s 
remaining creditors. The liquidator, on behalf of the creditors, sought to have the 
company declared an alias of Mr. Solomon or a sham and an attempt for Mr. 
Solomon to escape liability for the debts of his creditors.  
 
The House of Lords held that a company, duly formed and registered under the 
relevant legislation, was in law ‘a different person altogether’ from the person who is 
the beneficial owner of all the shares. Once a company has so been formed, motives 
for incorporation are irrelevant when determining the company’s rights and liabilities. 
Therefore, even though it may be that ‘after incorporation the business is precisely 
the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the same 
hands receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscriber or 
trustee for them.’60 As there was no fraud on the part of Mr. Solomon, the court held 
that the secured debentures were valid against the company’s creditors.  
                                                           
58
 Solomon v Solomon 1897 A.C. 22 (HL). 
59
 FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2012) 33. 
60
 Solomon v Solomon supra (n 38) Per Lord Macnaghten 51. 
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Solomon v Solomon61 is still today considered authority for the strict separate legal 
personality of a company and the fact that the shareholders cannot be held liable for 
the debts of the company.  
 
By 1890 the separate legal personality of a company and the limited liability of its 
shareholders was therefore accepted by the both the legislature and the courts in 
England. 
 
SEPARATE LEGAL PERSONALITY AND LIMITED LIABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
LEGISLATION 
 
Being a former colony of Britain, South African Company Law has always been 
influenced by English law.62 The Cape Joint Stock Companies Limited Liability Act of 
1861 was the first company legislation introduced in South Africa. This act was 
almost a verbatim adoption of the English Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 and 
the Limited Liability Act of 1855.63 The limited liability company in this manner found 
its way into our law.  
 
Developments in English company law over time would result in the establishment of 
commissions to research and make recommendations on whether the developments 
should also be mimicked in South Africa. Development of company law in these two 
jurisdictions therefore remained linked. So for example, the Companies Act 46 of 
1926 had seen many amendments over the years as English company law evolved 
and finally after the Van Wyk de Vries report (commissioned after the Jenkins Report 
in England), it was replaced by the Companies Act 61 of 1973.64  
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 Solomon v Solomon supra (n 38). 
62
 HS Cilliers and ML Benade et al Corporate Law (2000) 21. 
63
 HS Cilliers and ML Benade et al Corporate Law (2000) 23  
64
 HS Cilliers and ML Benade et al Corporate Law (2000) 24. 
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Although it seems as if limited liability was considered an automatic consequence of 
incorporation under previous company law legislation,65 the Companies Act of 
192666 did not make specific provision for limited liability. The 1926 Companies Act67 
provided that upon registration of the memorandum of association and articles, the 
members of the company form a body corporate with perpetual succession and that 
the body corporate would be capable of exercising all the functions of an 
incorporated company.68 The default form for companies was the unlimited 
company,69 but Companies were able provide for limited liability if they were 
incorporated as a limited company.70 Unlimited companies ceased to be the basic 
form under the Companies Act of 197371 by providing for the conversion of unlimited 
companies into limited companies.72  
 
The Act differs from its predecessors in that it specifically provides that the 
shareholders and directors generally are not liable for the company’s debts, as a 
consequence of its incorporation.73 For the first time the law specifically confirms the 
limited liability of shareholders for the debts of the Company as a default rule and 
applicable to all companies, unless a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation 
determines otherwise.  
 
Sections 19(1) and (2) of the Companies Act reads as follows: 
 
19 (1)  ‘From the date and time that the incorporation of a company is registered, 
as stated in its registration certificate, the company –  
(a) is a juristic person, which exits continuously until its name is 
removed from the company’s register in accordance with this Act; 
                                                           
65
 RA Stevens The External Relations of Company Groups in South African Law (2011) 61. 
66
 Companies Act 46 of 1926. 
67
 Companies Act 46 of 1926. 
68
 Section 18(2) of the Companies Act 46 of 1926. 
69
 Section 5, read together with section 18(1), of the Companies Act 46 of 1926. 
70
 RA Stevens The External Relations of Company Groups in South African Law (2011) 62. 
71
 Companies act 61 of 1973. 
72
 Section 25 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
73
 Section 19(2) of the Act. 
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(b) has all the legal power and capacity of an individual, except to 
the extent that – 
(i) a juristic person is incapable of exercising any such power, 
or having any such capacity;… 
 
(2) A person is not, solely by reason of being an incorporate, shareholder or 
director of a company, liable for any liabilities or obligations of the 
company, except to the extent that this Act or the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise.’ 
 
From the wording of section 19(2), it is clear that the default rule in terms of South 
African Company law is that a shareholder’s liability is limited when it comes to the 
debts of the company.  
 
THE ROLE OF COMMON LAW 
 
The introduction of legislation that regulates companies is not a complete code of 
company law and one must also consider the wider backdrop provided by the 
common law. Legislation regulating companies have confirmed the common law, 
altered the common law or operated parallel to the common law where the two 
systems are not in conflict with one another.  
 
The common law applicable to companies in South Africa, although not simple to 
identify, is modeled largely on English common law.74 Many rules of English 
common law were readily accepted in South Africa with little or no modification, for 
example the division of power between shareholders and directors, the ultra vires 
doctrine, the rule in Foss v Harbottle75 and the Turquand rule.76 In cases where no 
guidance can be found in our common law, our courts, because company legislation 
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had been taken from the English law, have used English law on the point in issue 
and have followed English precedents if such an approach was not in conflict with 
our law.77 In this way, the common law remedy for piercing the corporate veil was 
introduced into South African company law. 
 
ECONOMIC REASONS FOR LIMITED LIABILITY 
 
Like South Africa and the United Kingdom, (discussed above), most jurisdictions 
today acknowledge limited liability as the default rule applicable to companies.  
 
A commonly cited rational in support of limited liability as a default rule is based on 
the economic growth stimulated thereby. Supporters of limited liability state that it 
encourages economic growth, as it allows investors to limit the risk of investing 
funds into a business venture,78 enabling them to make riskier investments and 
enabling persons of moderate means to participate in economic markets. They 
therefore state that there is an economic need for limited liability. Fiscel and 
Easterbrook call this the economic theory of limited liability.79  
 
The economic theory submits that limited liability reduces the costs of operating a 
business for four reasons. Firstly, limited liability reduces monitoring costs for 
investors.80 If investors carried a greater risk, they would have to monitor the 
directors of the company more directly, resulting in additional costs to appoint agents 
for monitoring purposes. This would be particularly problematic for public and larger 
private companies where management is separate from its shareholders or 
members. In addition, investors would need to monitor who else has shareholding or 
membership in the company to ensure that they are not left bearing the company’s 
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liability alone. This again is of greater concern in public and larger private companies 
with extensive and changing membership.  
 
Secondly, limited liability increases managerial efficiency by increasing the 
transferability of shares.81 Shareholders can more easily trade in shares if it is a 
homogenous commodity with no personal liability attached. It also then follows that 
directors would be encouraged to manage a company more efficiently because they 
are at risk of being replaced by any new shareholders’ own choice of management 
should the company’s affairs not be managed optimally.  
 
Thirdly, limited liability supports diversification of investment portfolios.82 If 
shareholders had a liability attached to their shareholdings, they would have to 
reduce the number of companies in which they invest to reduce the risk and be able 
to monitor their investments. Investment decisions as such would become 
complicated as investors would first need to determine if the company they are 
investing in has an acceptable risk profile, adequate capitalisation and well-
resourced current shareholders. To reduce exposure and the costly, time-consuming 
monitoring, investors would limit their investments to a small number of companies. 
This limits an investor’s ability to reduce their risk through the diversification of their 
investments portfolios, which would in turn drive up their required rate of return. 
 
Finally, limited liability creates room for management to make decisions on 
investments of the company.83 Managers are able to invest in any project, including 
those that hold a higher risk, because shareholders will not stand to lose more than 
their investment where such projects fail. Where investors feel the need to monitor a 
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company’s behaviour, they would require continuous access to financial information 
and business decisions and will intervene in corporate decision making where they 
feel that investment projects are too risky.  
 
Accepting limited liability as the default rule is however not without its potential 
disadvantages. Theoretically, companies with limited liability are more likely not to 
hold and maintain sufficient funds or assets to pay creditors’ claims.84 Limited liability 
does not discourage the undercapitalisation of companies and therefore the 
concerns with regards to limited liability are most prominently experienced by the 
creditors of the company. When the company fails, the shareholders stand to lose 
only the amount they invested in the company; which is likely to have been 
undercapitalised in the first instance. Creditors are therefore left with an empty shell 
from which they have to collect debts. 
 
A counter argument that has been raised this concern with limited liability, is that 
from an economic perspective the difficulties for shareholders with an unlimited 
liability regime exceed the difficulties for creditors with a limited liability regime.85  
Although limited liability holds risks for the company’s creditors, creditors have the 
capability to protect against the risk of loss; at least in theory. Creditors can for 
example price for the risk of non-payment when calculating the rates at which 
services are provided. Those creditors with superior bargaining power can also 
protect themselves by requiring security over the company’s assets, retaining 
ownership of goods provided on credit, obtaining suretyships from directors etc. 
Therefore, creditors are assumed to be capable of protecting themselves against the 
risk of non-payment.86  
 
This reasoning however is based on the assumption that all relevant information was 
available to the creditor, enabling the creditor to accurately price for the risk, and that 
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creditors do have bargaining power.87 This can however not be said where the 
creditor is a small enterprise providing goods to a larger business. In these cases, 
they may have limited bargaining power and not necessarily have the economic 
security to insist on security against non-payment, or the economic conditions and 
competition on the market might not allow them to do so.88 Further, the capability of 
stronger credit providers to negotiate security puts weaker credit providers at a 
greater risk. Lack of information can also contribute to incorrect risk pricing.89 Larger 
companies may have complex structures which frustrates the determination of credit 
risk. Similarly smaller companies may not have the infrastructure to supply all the 
relevant information. Some creditors may also lack the knowledge and expertise to 
make accurate assessments of risk. And ultimately, unforeseeable market volatility 
can always occur.90 
 
This reasoning further takes into consideration that not all company creditors 
voluntarily acquire that status. Involuntary creditors, such as delictual claimants, are 
also at risk when a company’s shareholders are protected from liability for the 
actions of the company. Delictual claimants, unlike creditors, are not in a position to 
contractually protect themselves against the risk of harm and therefore may end up 
with claims against a company which has no means to pay compensation.91  
 
SEPARATE LEGAL PERSONALITIES & LIMITED LIABILITY WITHIN GROUPS 
COMPANIES 
 
In the modern world, company groups have become a commercial reality. 
Historically, forming corporate groups became possible when companies were 
granted the power to own shares.92 Over time, businesses structure developed and 
began to operate in complex groups. However, a company’s ability to own shares in 
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another company only occurred after the political and economic debate surrounding 
limited liability had been won by those who believed it to be essential for economic 
growth.93 
 
In England, the courts first recognised the ability for a company to own shares in 
another company in 1867.94 Once it was established that the company’s 
memorandum empowered it to hold shares in another company, the courts 
acknowledged the limited liability of a juristic shareholder in relation to its 
subsidiaries’ debt without apparent awareness that the holding company would in 
effect now have two layers of limited liability sheltering it from claims of its 
subsidiaries’ creditors.95  
 
Blumberg finds that from neither an academic nor a political perspective, was the 
application of limited liability to company groups debated.96  Extending limited liability 
to company groups meant that the holding company’s shareholders were protected 
by a second tier of limited liability from the group enterprise obligations. 
Notwithstanding questioning whether this development was in fact desirable, at the 
time of extending limited liability extending a second tier of protection was neither 
anticipated nor intended.97  
 
Historically therefore, limited liability preceded company groups and the extension of 
limited liability to holding companies in company groups also in South African 
company law, seems to have occurred as a convenience.98  
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REASONS FOR GROUPS 
 
Stephan Bainbridge stated that ‘[t]here is nothing intrinsically fraudulent about 
deciding to incorporate or about dividing a single enterprise into multiple 
corporations, even when done solely to get the benefit of limited liability.’99 
 
There are various advantages that come from utilising group structures which 
explains why they have gained popularity. In 1930, Bonbright and Means could 
already identify four reasons why groups of companies would be formed, namely: 
 
• to centralise control of previously independent companies; 
• to consolidate the financial structure of previously independent 
companies by the holding company in effect becoming the financier of 
the subsidiaries under its control; 
• to recapitalise the financial structure of one or more companies by 
substituting the shares of the holding company for shares in the 
subsidiary; and 
• to gain voting control in a subsidiary with very little financial 
investment.100 
 
With increasing legislative intervention and regulation of different industries, groups 
today are used for various reasons in addition to the listed above reasons. One 
example is to enable an enterprise to operate different types of businesses, each 
subject to its own set of registration requirements, regulatory scrutiny and reporting 
requirements (e.g. capital adequacy and licensing requirements for banks, insurers 
and other financial services providers). It would be too onerous if the enterprise as a 
whole or each of its business units had to comply with all the regulatory 
requirements under different legislation.101 Especially for multi-national companies, 
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being able to set up a separate company in each of its trading countries may be the 
only way to gain access to that market and comply with local legislation. In short, 
larger enterprises can be operated more proficiently in the form of separate 
companies, each capable of complying with the regulations applicable to its 
operations, but ultimately controlled by one holding company.  
 
The incorporation of subsidiary companies can also create a platform for more 
efficient management of a larger business.102 Where the business of a company 
becomes more complex it may be sensible to break up the company in smaller 
companies that each has its own management structure and is able to focus on the 
portion of the business for which it is responsible.103  
 
A further modern use of subsidiaries is forming Special Purpose Vehicles to facilitate 
funding agreements. By incorporating a Special Purpose Vehicle, a controlling 
shareholder can seek outside investment without relinquishing any shares or control 
of the holding company by offering outside investors a minority share in the 
subsidiary.104 In South Africa, company groups are often used to facilitate Black 
Economic Employment transactions in the same way. Policy makers have also 
created tax incentives and favourable exchange control regulations in order to 
encourage the establishment of headquarter companies in South Africa, as a 
gateway for investment in Africa. Over the past years, National Treasury has 
confirmed its policy to encourage investors to establish holding companies in South 
Africa, from where their subsidiaries in Africa can be operated, with the intent to 
boost local tax revenue, dividends, competitiveness, job creation and economic 
growth.105 
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The most prominent reason, however, remains reducing the risk to which the holding 
company is exposed.106 Every company within the group of companies has its own 
separate legal personality and therefore bears its own risks and liabilities. The 
individual companies within the group do not become liable for the obligations and 
liabilities for other companies within the group. Where individual companies within 
the group therefore have limited liability, the commercial risk of the group structure is 
effectively reduced. Where a holding company controls its subsidiaries through 
shareholding, subsidiaries can be incorporated with minimal capital to undertake 
risky business ventures without exposing the whole group to that risk. If the business 
venture fails, the holding company only loses its investment made in the subsidiary. 
The rational is similar to that applied where an entrepreneur invests in a company; 
the limited liability encourages investments that would otherwise not be made if the 
shareholder were to have unlimited personal liability if the business venture in 
question fails.  
 
CONCERNS IN GROUPS 
 
According to Botha107 the basic characteristic of a group is that: 
 
‘…the management of the different and independent holding and subsidiary 
companies comprising the group is coordinated in such a way that they are 
managed on a central and unified basis in the interest of the group as a 
whole. This management on a unified basis is possible because of the 
control, implicit in the holding/subsidiary company relations, which the holding 
company exercises over the subsidiary or subsidiaries. This control makes it 
possible that the group is managed as an economic unit, in the sense that the 
different holding and subsidiary companies no longer carry out their 
commercial activities on a footing of complete economic independence.’ 
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The management of the different independent holding and subsidiary companies 
comprising the group is coordinated in a way that actually takes place on a central 
and unified basis in the interest of the group as a whole. This management on a 
unified basis is made possible through the holding company’s control of its 
subsidiaries.108 Through this control, the group is capable of being managed as a 
single economic entity, in the sense that the holding company and its subsidiary 
companies no longer carry out their commercial activities independently.109 This 
economic interrelationship coupled with control can be used to camouflage the 
economic reality or location of risk and may lead to abuse. 
 
The concerns with limited liability, as discussed above, are also relevant within 
company groups. The holding company is not discouraged from undercapitalising its 
subsidiaries, leaving the creditors of the subsidiary exposed if the company fails. 
The concern in groups is however augmented by the often complicated structures 
making it unclear to creditors in which company their risk lies. Group structures 
intentionally or unintentionally camouflage the economic reality of individual 
companies within the group and the exact allocation of risk. Without proper due 
diligence, the creditor may find its exposure lies with an empty shell company within 
the larger group. Creditors who are not able to insist on ring-fenced security may find 
that after its due diligence, the company’s assets are transferred to another 
company within the group, and that its exposure thereafter lies with an empty shell 
company. 
 
Blumberg110 dismisses some of the economic theories in support of limited liability 
when it comes to company groups, especially in a group that consists of a holding 
company and its wholly-owned subsidiaries.  
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Firstly, he states that the justification that limited liability decreases the need for 
shareholders to monitor managers is not applicable in these types of groups.111  It is 
clear that the holding company would have incentive to monitor the activities of its 
wholly-owned subsidiaries.  
 
Secondly, the justification that limited liability encourages managers to manage the 
company at utmost efficiency to the benefit of the shareholders as it promotes the 
free transfer of shares has less application to holding companies and wholly-owned 
subsidiaries.112 Where the holding company controls the subsidiary, it is in a position 
to appoint the subsidiaries’ management. 
 
Thirdly, the fact that limited liability is pertinent to the operation of the securities 
markets is largely irrelevant in the case of a wholly-owned subsidiary, where the 
structure of the group is of such a nature that all the shares will be owned by the 
holding company and trade in shares therefore is rendered irrelevant.113 This 
justification is still relevant in the case of a partially-owned subsidiary, where there is 
a market for the trade of shares in the subsidiary. This is, however, limited to the 
trading of the minority shares and the reasoning is still sound in relation to the 
majority shareholding of the holding company.114 
 
Finally, the fact that limited liability permits efficient diversification by shareholders, 
which in turn allows shareholders to reduce their individual risk, is less applicable to 
holding companies.115 Companies are less risk averse than individuals. The ultimate 
investors in the subsidiary are, through their shareholding in the holding company, 
the investors in the holding company. These investors are still capable of diversifying 
their investment independent of the holding company if the risk of the subsidiaries 
were to be assumed by the holding company.116  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The separate legal persona of a company and the limited liability of the shareholders 
of a company has long been the basis of modern company law. Indeed, without it, 
the world economy would have looked very different and expansion arguably would 
have occurred at a much slower rate.  
 
Historically, limited liability was extended to the holding company within a company 
group as a matter of convenience.  The limited liability of companies that operate 
within a group seems to have come about without consideration of the economic 
relationship the companies share and that they in actual fact operate as a single 
entity in the interest of the group as a whole. Limited liability does not make sense 
where company groups are in fact operated as a single entity as they all operate for 
the benefit of the group.117 Each company benefits from the integration of activities 
within the group and the separateness that justifies limiting liability of its 
shareholders of the individual companies within the group is less clear where 
interests are intertwined.118 Many of the policy considerations, such as encouraging 
investment, and economic reasons in favour of limited liability do not apply within 
groups.  
 
In the modern economy, where the world’s largest corporations are operated in a 
company group structure, the unqualified recognition of limited liability has created 
fundamental problems and imbalances. Certain concerns, relating for example to the 
abuse of the corporate structure to escape liability, has however not always been 
tolerated. These instances and remedies provided to those who suffer as a result of 
such abuse will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE COMMON LAW REMEDY FOR PIERCING THE 
CORPORATE VEIL 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter, the principles of the separate legal personality of the 
company and the limited liability of its shareholders were discussed. Although these 
principles lie at the heart of company law and have been entrenched in statutes, 
concerns were discussed as to how these characteristics may be abused within a 
group of companies. The separate legal personality of a company can be used to 
house the liability of a holding company in a different entity and so enable the 
holding company to avoid liability for that entity’s obligations, although it controls 
which obligations it may incur.  
 
The courts have played an essential role in developing remedies to address the 
abuses or inequitable consequences of the separate legal personality of juristic 
persons and the limited liability of shareholders. One remedy available to address 
abuses of the separate legal personality of a company is the common law remedy of 
piercing the corporate veil. This remedy allows a court to disregard the veil of 
incorporation to determine where the right, liability or obligation truly lies. When the 
corporate veil is pierced, the court ignores the separate existence of the company 
and treats the shareholders of the company, as if they had been acting for their own 
account.   
 
In this chapter, the common law remedy of piercing the corporate veil and the 
effectiveness of the remedy in addressing abuses within company groups will be 
discussed. 
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COMMON LAW REMEDY OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL  
 
The exact origin of the common law remedy of piercing the corporate is uncertain. 
The remedy seems to be based on the laws of equity.119 It is however considered 
trite law that the courts are justified to disregard a company’s separate legal 
personality to allocate liability where it rightly belongs.120 This is commonly known as 
piercing the corporate veil. 
 
In Botha v Van Niekerk121 the court states that: 
 
‘[D]ie oortuiging [het] algaande meer aanvaarding gevind by howe sowel as 
navorsers dat ontwikkeling van die erkenning van die maatskappy as 'n 
verdere persona in die reg plaasgevind het weens die behoefte daaraan in 
die verkeer, maar dat nadele kan ontstaan en onreg tot stand kan kom juis 
deur 'n aandrang op die erkenning van die afsonderlikheid van die 
regspersoon. Dit kom voor asof besef is dat om 'n volstrektheid te verleen 
aan die erkenning van die afsonderlikheid van die maatskappy soms inhou 
dat verder gegaan word as die doel en rede vir die erkenning van die 
bestaanbaarheid van 'n regspersoon; dat so 'n benadering die heer kan 
word van onreg in plaas daarvan dat erkenning van regspersoonlikheid 
bloot die verkeersbehoeftes volgens billikheidsmaatstawwe dien; dat dit nie 
vir voldoening aan die behoeftes van die gemeenskap nodig is om 'n 
regspersoon so te benader dat totaal onaanvaarbare resultate ontstaan 
omdat partye toegelaat word om 'n fiktiewe persoon in die alledaagse 
verkeer te laat optree nie.’122 
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Where the corporate veil is pierced, the right and obligations of the company is 
transferred to the shareholders of the company, disregarding both the separate legal 
personality of the company as well as the limited liability of the shareholders. 
 
The courts will however not lightly disregard a company’s separate legal personality: 
 
‘It is undoubtedly a salutary principle that our courts should not lightly 
disregard a company’s separate personality, but should strive to give effect to 
and uphold it. To do otherwise would negate or undermine the policy and 
principles that underpin the concept of separate corporate personality and the 
legal consequences that attach to it. But where fraud, dishonesty or other 
improper conduct (and I confine myself to such situations) is found to be 
present, other considerations will come into play. The need to reserve the 
separate corporate identify would in such circumstances have to be balanced 
against policy considerations which arise in favour of piercing the corporate 
veil.’123 
 
In the United Kingdom, some judges have grappled with accepting that the court has 
the authority to disregard the corporate veil. In VTB Capital v Nutritek International 
Corp124 Lord Neuberger discusses the arguments regarding the existence, if at all, of 
the principle of piercing the corporate veil. The court refers to the case of Solomon v 
Solomon125 where Lord Halsbury said that a legally incorporated company ‘must be 
treated like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to 
itself…It is impossible to say at the same time that there is a company and there is 
not.’126  Accordingly, the fact that the precise nature, basis and meaning of piercing 
the corporate veil are all somewhat obscure, as is the precise nature of 
circumstances in which the corporate veil will be pierced, supports the argument that 
                                                           
123
 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 (4) SA 790 (A) at 803H. 
124
 VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp and Others 2013 UKSC 5. 
125
 Solomon v Solomon supra (n 38). 
126
 VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp and Others supra (n 124) at 122; Solomon v Solomon supra (n 38) at 
30-31. 
34 
 
there is no principled basis upon which it can be said that the court can pierce the 
corporate veil.127 However, on the facts of this case, Lord Neuberger found it 
unnecessary to decide whether in the absence legislation providing for the court to 
pierce the corporate veil, the courts have the power to do so.128 The court was able 
to provide relief without piercing the corporate veil. 
 
The South African courts have readily accepted that they are able to pierce the 
corporate veil in certain circumstances.  
 
Piercing the corporate veil can equally be used to pierce the veil between a 
company and its shareholders or its holding company. In order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of this remedy as a tool to address abuses within company groups, it is 
necessary to look at the circumstances under which the courts will pierce the 
corporate veil. 
 
REQUIREMENTS FOR PIERCING  
 
Determining the requirements for piercing the veil have always been difficult as the 
courts have not generally followed consistent principles in determining when they will 
depart from the principle that a company is a separate legal person.129 
 
The courts, to the contrary, have guarded against discerning specific circumstances 
under which the corporate veil should be pierced; and have always avoided laying 
down rigid rules.130 This is partly attributed to the fact that, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, the doctrine of limited liability and separate legal personality lies at 
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the heart of company law;131 concepts that courts therefore have not been willing to 
ignore merely because it might in any given case be just or equitable to do so.132 As 
limited liability and separate legal personality of companies are bestowed by 
policymakers under legislation, another layer of cautiousness exists which the courts 
first have to consider before it can pierce the corporate veil.133 In Cape Pacific Ltd v 
Lubner Controlling Investments the court considered the remedy of piercing the 
corporate veil and found the law to be far from settled with regard to the 
circumstances under which it would be permissible to pierce the corporate veil.134 
The court also did not consider it necessary or advisable to attempt to set out 
specific principles. Each case should be considered on the facts.135 
 
Domanski points out that the problem with setting categories of conduct which would 
justify piercing is that it will not allow for piercing in circumstances falling outside of 
these categories but where piercing may still be justified on the basis of public policy 
and fairness.136 He argues for a more principled approach requiring the court to 
weigh up those policy considerations justifying piercing against those policy 
considerations which are stacked against it. Cassim also finds the courts’ approach 
of not setting down a finite test to be commendable.137 The danger of setting rules is 
that a situation may arise where justice or equity calls for the court to pierce the veil, 
but it will then not be able to grant such relief where certain pre-determined facts are 
not present.138  
 
Veil piercing therefore is considered on a case by case basis with no clear 
underlying considerations or tests. Guidance as to when the remedy will be available 
can however be found with reference those cases in which the courts did pierce the 
corporate veil and can give a better understanding of this remedy.  
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As a point of departure, it is required that the shareholders of the company control 
the company.139 Complete control is not necessary. The control must however be to 
the extent that the shareholders are able to dominate the finances, policies and 
practices of the company to such degree that it can be found that the company had 
no separate mind, will or existence of its own.140 In Hulse-Reutter v Godde141 the 
court held that ‘there must at least be some misuse or abuse of the distinction 
between the corporate entity and those who control it which results in an unfair 
advantage being afforded to the latter.’142 It should therefore at least be that the 
abusive conduct had been brought about by those in control of the company and 
that they received an unfair advantage as a result of such conduct.  
 
It should be noted that the definition of company groups as set out in the Act 
requires there to be related or interrelated (direct or indirect) control by one company 
over the other.143 In the context of group companies, a holding company’s control 
over its subsidiaries can be assumed; and where two entities are related or 
interrelated to one another, direct or indirect control may be present. 
 
Control and ownership alone is however not sufficient to disregard the company’s 
separate personality.144 Once control is established, other considerations must be 
taken into account. Williams finds that, after control is established, the courts will 
turn to determining whether the company is a mere façade to conceal the true facts 
or a wrongdoing ‘so that the separate existence of the company is being abused.’145 
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In Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments,146 the court gave some 
guidelines as to the approach that has been followed in piercing cases. Smalberger 
(J) found it to be a salutary principle that the separate legal personality of a company 
is an important norm that the courts should not lightly disregard, but rather should 
strive to give effect to and defend.147 ‘To do otherwise would negate or undermine 
the policy and principles that underpin the concept of separate legal personality and 
the legal consequences attached to it.’148 
 
In some circumstances however, the need to uphold the separate legal personality 
has to be balanced against policy considerations in favour of piercing the corporate 
veil.149 
 
Smalberger (J) identified these circumstances to be where fraud, dishonesty or 
improper conduct (and the court confined itself to these situations) were found to be 
present.150 The court referred to the decision in The Shipping Corporation of India 
Ltd v Evdomon Corporation,151 where it was confirmed that the circumstances under 
which the court will pierce the corporate veil generally were those which ‘include an 
element of fraud or other improper conduct in the establishment or use of the 
company or the conduct of its affairs. In this connection the words ‘device’, 
‘stratagem’, ‘cloak’ and ‘sham’ have been used.152 In these circumstances, ‘the court 
would be entitled to look to substance rather than form in order to arrive at the true 
fact, and if there has been a misuse of the corporate personality, to disregard it and 
attribute liability where it should rightly lie.’153 
 
It should be noted that it is not necessary for the company to have been founded in 
deceit, and never have been intended to operate properly as a company, before its 
                                                           
146
 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd supra (n 123).  
147
 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd supra (n 123) at 31. 
148
 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd supra (n 123) at 31. 
149
 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd supra (n 123) at 31. 
150
 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments supra (Pty) Ltd (n 123) at 31. 
151
  The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation and Another 1994(1) SA 550 (A). 
152
 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd supra (n 123) at 31. 
153
 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd supra (n 123) at 32. 
38 
 
separate legal personality can be disregarded.154 If an otherwise legitimately 
established and operating company is misused in a particular instance for a 
fraudulent, dishonest or improper purpose, there is no reason why its separate legal 
personality cannot be disregarded in relation to that specific act.155  
 
Williams156 groups the courts’ decisions to pierce the corporate veil into three 
categories; where the separate existence of the company was used to perpetuate a 
fraud, where the company is the alter ego or an instrumentality of its shareholders, 
and where, on the facts, the corporate veil should be pierced in the interest of justice 
or fairness. 
 
Fraud and improper conduct 
 
The presence of fraud has been widely accepted as sufficient justification for 
piercing the corporate veil.157 In Lategan v Boyes158 the court held that there was no 
doubt that the court will pierce the corporate veil where fraudulent use is made of the 
separate legal personality of the company.159  
 
Alter ego or instrumentality 
 
A company is not merely an agent for its shareholders,160 but the courts have found 
that one policy consideration in favour of piercing is the fundamental doctrine that 
the law gives regard the substance rather than the form of things.161 The court will 
therefore pierce the corporate veil if it appears that the shareholders did not treat the 
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company as a separate entity, but instead treated it as their ‘alter ego’ or an 
‘instrumentality’ to promote their own interest.162  
 
This would occur where the shareholder in control of the company does not separate 
his or her own interest from that of the company and furthers his or her own interests 
in conducting business, albeit using the company as a conduit in doing so. 
 
In these instances, the presence of fraud is not essential for veil piercing.163 The 
considering factor is not an intention to defraud, but that the separate personality of 
the company was used by the shareholders to obtain advantages without treating 
the company as a separate entity. 
 
In the interest of justice 
 
A third category of piercing is where, on the facts, the corporate veil should be 
pierced in the interest of justice or fairness. Williams164 does not expand on this 
category but it seems to be broad enough to include any circumstance where justice 
requires that the veil must be pierced.  
 
AVAILABILITY OF OTHER REMEDIES 
 
One principle that the court has been less consistent on is whether the existence of 
an alternative remedy would bar the aggrieved party from seeking the corporate veil 
to be pierced.  
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In Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments165 the court stated that the 
existence of an alternative remedy would not bar a party from seeking relief in the 
form of piercing of the corporate veil. The court states that whilst the existence of an 
alternative remedy is a factor in determining whether or not a veil piercing order 
should be granted, it will not bar such relief.166 The court found that there is no 
reason why piercing of the corporate veil should be precluded if another remedy 
exists. It is a general rule that if a person has more than one legal remedy at his 
disposal, it is his choice under which to institute action and he is not obliged to 
pursue one over the other.167 The same should apply in an application for piercing of 
the corporate veil; the existence of another remedy, or the failure to pursue what 
would have been an available remedy, should not bar the court from granting the 
relief by piercing.168 The existence of another remedy, or the failure to pursue one 
that was available, is however a relevant factor where policy considerations are 
being considered.169 Even so, it cannot be of overriding importance. 
 
In Hulse-Reutter v Godde170 the court departed from the approach in Cape Pacific. 
The court stated that the exceptional nature of the relief sought requires that there 
must be no other remedy available to the aggrieved party.171 One argument why 
piercing the corporate veil can never be merely an alternative remedy is that all 
alternative remedies necessarily assume what an order obtained of piercing denies, 
that is the existence of the company as a separate entity.172 This stricter approach 
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followed in Hulse-Reutter v Godde173 was supported by the court in Amlin (SA) Pty 
Lt v Van Kooj174 where the court stressed that because piercing the veil is such a 
drastic remedy it should be used sparingly and therefore only as a last resorts in 
circumstances where justice will not otherwise be done between two litigants.175  
 
The court in Hulse-Reutter v Godde176 did not give a reason for disregarding the 
approach in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments.177 
 
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS  
 
The courts have on occasion looked behind the corporate veil where it is clear that 
the intention of the parties was to run a business as a partnership, although they 
incorporated the business in the form of a company. In Ebrahim v Westbourne 
Galleries Ltd178 the court gave recognition to the underlining partnership of the 
parties and found that the true intention of the parties was to establish a partnership, 
thus disregarding the separate legal personality that the company structure would 
have brought about. Characteristic of the underlying relationship, such as that the 
business relationship was formed or continued on the basis of a personal 
relationship of mutual trust, or the understanding that all the shareholders will 
participate in the day to day management of the business, are indicative of the 
parties’ true intention with regards to the form in which the business will be 
operated.179 
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PIERCING WITHIN THE GROUP CONTEXT 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the separate legal personality and limited liability of a 
holding company as a shareholder is widely recognised in many jurisdictions.  
 
It was pointed out that the economic relationship in company groups is different from 
the economic relationship between an individual shareholder and a company for 
various reasons. There is a clear separation of economic interest in the relationship 
between an individual shareholder and a company where the shareholder intends 
merely to be an inactive investor, with limited liability equal to his investment. A 
holding company as shareholder in a subsidiary has the same economic interest as 
the subsidiary and they both operate in the interest of the group as a whole. In 
reality, the holding company controls which obligations and risks the subsidiary will 
accept, and cannot be seen as a mere inactive investor. The economic justifications 
for limited liability are also not applicable to company groups. It cannot be said that 
investment by a holding company would be discouraged without limited liability, as 
the holding company’s shareholders are still protected by the limited liability of the 
holding company itself. It has therefore been said that piercing the corporate veil 
between a holding company and its subsidiary should be easier as the group is in 
reality managed as one economic unit and piercing would not result in individual 
shareholders being held personally liable.180 The result of piercing between groups 
can merely be that an additional layer of protection is removed. 
 
The landmark case in this regards is Adams v Cape Plc,181  where the court had to 
consider the argument of piercing the corporate veil between a subsidiary company 
and its holding company. The facts of this case were briefly discussed in Chapter 1. 
In this case the court held that the ‘…law, for better or worse, recognises the 
creation of subsidiary companies, which though in a sense the creatures of their 
parent companies, will nevertheless under the general law fall to be treated as 
                                                           
180
 S Brainbridge ‘Abolishing Veil Piercing’ (2000-2001) 528. 
181
 Adams v Cape Industries Plc supra (n 1). 
43 
 
separate legal entities with all the rights and liabilities which would normally attach to 
separate legal entities.’182 
 
The judgment in Solomon v Solomon183 therefore is of great significance also in 
defining the relationship between holding company and its subsidiaries.184 It follows 
that in the absence of fraud, the holding company and its subsidiaries each has a 
separate legal personality possessing its own interest, rights, liabilities and 
obligations.185 Each company within a group would have to institute action and 
enforce its own rights.186 The mere fact that the holding company has control over 
the subsidiary does not make the subsidiary the holding company’s agent.187  
 
There has been legislative intervention to address concerns surrounding group 
companies who are able to camouflage individual companies economic and risk 
realities. This has been said to point to legislative recognition that group companies 
should be treated differently when it comes to the separate legal personality of the 
groups. In DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets Londen Borough Council188 
Lord Denning went to far as to express the view that there is a general tendency, 
evidenced by the statutory requirement for group accounts, that the separate legal 
personality of companies within a group should more readily be ignored, especially 
in the case of wholly-owned subsidiaries.189 The court relied on the idea that the 
group of companies was a single economic entity.190 In this case, the land upon 
which the holding company conducted business was owned by its subsidiary. The 
land became subject to a compulsory purchase and the court held that the holding 
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company was entitled to the compensation for disruption of its business as a 
consequence of the expropriation. 
 
Cassim however states that (although initially having been more liberal) it seems as 
if the trend in South Africa has in recent years leaned towards the conservative 
approach, also when considering whether the veil should be pierced between groups 
of companies.191 In Ex Parte Gore192 the court states that: 
 
‘Our own jurisprudence contains an en passant acknowledgment of the 
apparent trend during the 1960’s and 70’s towards an readier willingness to 
ignore the separate personality of individual companies in the group context 
(see Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd and Another 1988 (3) SA 290 
(A), at 314H-316B), but the more recent conservative trend by the English 
courts evidenced in Adams has been endorse in subsequent South African 
judgments: see eg Wanbach v Maizecord Industries (Edms) Bpk 1993 (2) 
SA 669 (A), at 675D-E and Macadamia Finance BK en ‘n Ander v De Wet 
en Andere NNO 1993 (2) SA 745 (A), at 748B-D)’193 
 
The better view is therefore that although the legislature has recognised and 
introduced legislation to address certain concerns that are unique to group 
enterprises, there is no general tendency towards treating groups of companies as a 
single entity.194 The English courts, subsequent to the DHN-case, have also not 
endorsed the principle of a single economic entity. 195   
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Agency 
 
When it comes to disregarding the separate legal personality of companies within a 
group, the courts have invoked the principles of agency to pierce the corporate veil 
and transfer liability to the holding company.196  
 
An example of such a case was that of Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd v Lord Mayor, 
Aldermen Citizens of the City of Birmingham.197 In this case, a holding company 
sought to be declared the principal of its subsidiary with regards to a certain 
transaction, as the subsidiary was barred to claim compensation under the Land 
Clauses Consolidation Act 1845. The court stated that the mere fact that the holding 
company held all the shares in the subsidiary company did not result in therein that 
the subsidiary would always act as the agent on behalf or be the alter ego of its 
holding company.198 The court identified several points which tend to establish 
agency. Firstly, the holding company treats the profits of the subsidiary as its own. 
Secondly, the holding company appoints the managers of the subsidiary. Thirdly, 
that the holding company directs the subsidiary in how to conduct its business. And 
finally, the holding company had complete control over the subsidiary.199 The court 
found that the two companies were in fact one and the same entity and held that 
holding company was therefore entitled to claim compensation for the compulsory 
acquisition of the premises.200 The courts found that all the factors could be 
answered in favour thereof that the relationship between the holding company and 
the subsidiary was intended to be that of a principal and agent. 
 
To provide a remedy under the laws of agency, an agency relationship must first be 
established under the principles of agency law. The facts of each case will be 
considered to determine an underlining agency relationship. It can therefore not be 
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said that in the context of company groups there is a presumption of agency.201 
Each company within a group of companies is a separate entity and should be 
treated as such unless the facts points to an agency relationship. 
 
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN OTHER COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS 
 
In evaluating jurisprudence in other common law jurisdiction and the courts’ 
approaches to piercing the corporate veil, many similarities are found in relation to 
the South African courts’ approach.  
 
The English courts have been cautious to lift/pierce the veil of incorporation and 
impose liability on those behind it. Nyombi202 attributes this to be because corporate 
personality is granted by statute. The English courts have not revealed any 
consistency as to when the remedy of piercing will be granted and each case is 
determined on its own facts. In Commissioner of Land Tax v Theosophical 
Foundations Pty Ltd203 the court stated that: 
 
‘Authorities in which the veil of incorporation has been lifted have not been of 
such consistency that any principle can be adduced. The cases merely 
provide instance in which courts have on the fact refused to be bound by the 
form or fact of incorporation when justice requires the substance or reality to 
be investigated.’ 204 
 
In Faiza Ben Hashem v Shayif205 the court listed principles which summarises the 
English courts’ approach to piercing the corporate veil where the company was used 
as a façade: 
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• Ownership and control of a company alone is not sufficient to justify 
piercing; 
• The court may not pierce the veil simply because it is necessary to do 
so in the interest of justice; 
• Piercing the veil can only occur if there was some impropriety; 
• Pierce the corporate veil can however also not occur merely because 
the company is involved in some impropriety. The impropriety must be 
linked to the use of the company structure to avoid or conceal liability; 
• Therefore, for the court to pierce the veil, it must be shown that the 
wrongdoer was in control of the company and misuse of the company 
structure as a device or façade to hide impropriety.206  
 
In the United States of America, the remedy of veil piercing has infamously been 
described to be ‘[l]ike lightning…rare, severe, and unprincipled.’207 Ramsay, in 
concluding the outcome of an empirical study on the degree to which veil piercing is 
undertaken by the courts in the United States, finds that veil piercing in the United 
States can still be described as ‘vague and largely unprincipled.’208 However, the 
courts in the United States have tended to apply similar factors when deciding the 
appropriateness of piercing the corporate veil.209 The courts have pierced the 
corporate veil where the separate legal personality of the company was used to 
perpetuate a fraud.210 Fraud is however not a requirement for piercing.211 Other 
general circumstances under which the courts in the United States have pierced the 
corporate veil was where there was non-compliance with corporate formalities212, the 
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entity was undercapitalised213 and where an entity was merely an instrumentality 
and in actual fact the alter ego of its incorporators.214 
 
In Australia, the courts approach veil piercing cases on an ad hoc basis, with 
underlying policy considerations in mind.215 While there is no closed list of 
circumstances under which the court will pierce the corporate veil, the courts have 
recognised that the presence of fraud, an agency relationship, unfairness; or where 
the company is a sham or façade may lead to piercing.216  
 
To conclude, it seems therefore that in all common law jurisdictions the approach to 
veil piercing is unprincipled. While, through jurisprudence, the courts have identified 
categories or factors, such as when the companies separate legal personality is 
being used to perpetrate a fraud and the company is merely the alter ego of the 
shareholders, uncertainty remains and each case is considered on its own facts and 
merits. This does however allow the courts to develop the remedy and provide relief 
where justice requires it.  
 
PROBLEMS WITH THE COMMON LAW VEIL PIERCING 
 
The concern with the piercing the corporate veil under common law is that it leaves 
uncertainty with regards to the circumstances under which the corporate veil would 
be pierced.217 According to Bainbridge, veil piercing achieves, ‘neither fairness nor 
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efficiency, but rather only uncertainty and lack of predictability, increasing 
transaction costs for small businesses.’218 
 
Investors for example are left with little certainty as to whether incorporating their 
businesses will limit their investment risk exposure. Without predictability as to when 
the court will disregard a company’s separate legal personality and transfer its 
liabilities onto its shareholders, investors are unable to discern the risks to which 
they are exposed or to identify the need to reduce their risk by limiting their 
investments.  
 
The unpredictability also creates uncertainty for creditors and victims of delicts. 
Litigating can be a costly exercise and without certainty, litigants may not have the 
risk appetite to litigate a veil piercing matter.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Piercing the corporate veil as a common law remedy has played an essential role in 
addressing abuses of the separate legal personality and limited liability of the 
shareholders of a company. The circumstances under which the remedy would be 
available is however uncertain. The courts have steered clear from formulating 
specific circumstances under which the court will pierce the corporate veil. The 
courts approach applications to pierce the corporate veil on a case to case basis. 
This approach has both been praised and criticised. Whilst some believe that not 
having rigid rules allows the necessary flexibility to still provide a remedy in those 
cases where the circumstances do not fall within the prescribed circumstance under 
which a court may pierce;219 others argue that this creates too much uncertainty in 
the market as the risk of piercing is indeterminable.220  
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In cases where the courts are requested to pierce the corporate veil between 
company groups, they have stringently upheld the separate legal personality of the 
individual companies within the group. This is in spite thereof that the policy 
considerations justifying limited liability cannot be applied where the shareholder is a 
holding company. Although piercing can provide a remedy to address abuses in 
company groups, it has not been developed to take into consideration that different 
policy considerations need to be considered when deciding to pierce the veil 
between company groups.  
 
There would be a great advantage in introducing a statutory remedy for piercing. It 
has the potential to provide much needed certainty to shareholders with regards to 
the risk of losing the limitation on their liability; and to creditors and tort claimants as 
to when they will succeed in claiming relief. This type of certainty will reduce 
litigation costs. In the next chapter, the statutory remedy for piercing the corporate 
veil, under Section 20(9) of the Act, will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 4: STATUTORY REMEDY FOR PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter, piercing the corporate veil under the common law was 
discussed. It was concluded that there are many concerns with the common law 
remedy for piercing the corporate veil. The courts, in general, treat piercing cases on 
a case to case basis. Although piercing the corporate veil under common law can 
provide a remedy to address those cases where there was abuse of the separate 
legal personality of individual companies within a company group, the remedy does 
not consider concerns that are specific to groups and that policy considerations 
justifying limited liability cannot as readily be applied to the holding company within a 
company group.  
 
In this chapter, the statutory remedy for piercing the corporate veil as set out in 
section 20(9) of the Act will be discussed. Section 20(9) determines that if, on 
application by an interested person or in any proceeding in which a company is 
involved, the court finds that the incorporation of a company, the use thereof or any 
act by or on its behalf constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality 
of the company as a separate entity, the court may (a) declare that the company is 
not to be deemed to be juristic person in respect of any right, obligation or liability of 
the company or of a shareholder of the company; and (b) make any further order it 
deems appropriate to give effect to such declaration.  
 
The research will focus on determinering whether this remedy is sufficient to deter 
abuses that occur in company groups and provide an adequate remedy in the case 
where such abuse did occur. A further question that the research will seek to answer 
is whether the statutory provision to pierce the corporate veil substantially alters the 
position that prevailed under the common law with regards to when the corporate 
veil will be pierced. 
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STATUTORY REMEDY FOR PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL UNDER THE 
COMPANIES ACT 
 
The South African legislature in the Act for the first time introduced in South African 
Company Law a statutory provision permitting the courts to disregard the separate 
legal personality of a company.  
 
Section 20(9) of the Act provides the courts with statutory authority to piercing the 
corporate veil. This section reads as follows: 
 
‘20(9) If, on application by an interested person or in any proceedings in which 
a company is involved, a court finds that the incorporation of the company, any 
use of the company, or any act by or on behalf of the company, constitutes an 
unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of the company as a separate 
entity, the court may— 
 
(a) declare that the company is to be deemed not to be a juristic person in 
respect of any right, obligation or liability of the company or of a 
shareholder of the company or, in the case of a non-profit company, a 
member of the company, or of another person specified in the 
declaration; and 
 
(b) make any further order the court considers appropriate to give effect to 
a declaration contemplated in paragraph (a).’221 
 
This statutory remedy for piercing the corporate veil is equally applicable where the 
shareholder is a natural person or a juristic person. It therefore potentially can be a 
useful remedy in addressing concerns within company groups.  
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OTHER LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE COMPANIES ACT 2008 
 
The Act also makes provision for other forms of ‘piercing’ by imposing personal 
liability on directors and shareholders under certain circumstances or requiring 
transparency regarding the relationship between companies within a group. A 
detailed discussion of these instances is beyond the scope of this topic, but a brief 
discussion may be useful in forming an understanding of the tone of legislative 
intervention. 
 
Imposing Personal Liability 
 
● Section 21(2) determines that a person who entered into an agreement on 
behalf of a company prior to its incorporation will be liable for the 
obligations created under such agreement if the company is not 
subsequently incorporated or rejects the agreement after incorporation.  
 
● Section 77(3)(a) provides that a director will be held personally liable if a 
director acts in the name of the company, signed anything on behalf of the 
company, or purported to bind the company or authorise the taking of any 
action by or on behalf of the company, despite knowing the he or she 
lacked the authority to do so.  
 
● Section 77(3)(b) provides that a director can be held liable for knowingly 
carrying on the business of the company recklessly.  
 
● Section 77(3)(c) provides that a director can be held liable for the loss, 
damage or costs sustained by a company if he or she had been party to 
an act or omission by the company, knowing that such act or omission 
was calculated to defraud the creditors, employees or shareholders of the 
company.  
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● Section 77(3)(d) provides that a director can be held liable for signing, 
consenting to, or authorising, the publication of financial statements that 
were false or misleading or the inclusion of any untrue statements in a 
prospectus despite knowing that such statements were false, misleading 
or untrue.  
 
● Section 77(3)(e) provides that a director can be held liable for failing to 
vote against various decision, such as a decision relating to the issuing of 
unauthorised shares or approving an unlawful distribution.  
 
● Section 218(2) provides that a person who contravenes any provision of 
the Act is liable to any other person for any loss or damage suffered by 
that person as a result of that contravention. 
 
These provisions have been described to rather create instances where the 
corporate veil will be lifted as the veil of incorporation of the company is not 
completely disregarded under them.222 They will merely result in the person 
controlling the company in certain instances being held personally liable for the 
obligations of the company. Save for sections 21(2) and 218(2), they also provide 
for the liability of a director, and not the shareholder of the company.  
 
Transparency  
 
The legislature has also introduced specific provisions to address some of the 
concerns with companies group. The provisions focus on transparency and serve as 
a deterrent to abuses that may occur within a group structure. 
 
Cassim223 lists the following examples of where the legislature intervened to prevent 
abusive camouflaging: 
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● Group and consolidated financial statements are required to be produced 
in respect of a group of companies224 
 
● The auditor of a holding company has the right to access to all financial 
statement, current and past, of any subsidiary of that holding company 
and may require the directors or officers of the holding company or 
subsidiary company to disclose any information and provide an 
explanation in connection with any financial statement or in connection 
with the accounting records, books and documents of the subsidiary as 
may be necessary in the performance of the auditors’ duties225 
 
● The annual financial statement of a company must include a report by the 
company, or of the group of companies, if the company is part of a 
group226 
 
The Act further introduced valuable protection mechanisms to minority shareholders 
and creditors by requiring shareholder approval or that a solvency and liquidity test 
first be performed for certain intra group transactions. Section 41 of the Act, for 
example, determines that before a company issues shares to certain persons, 
which persons include the holding company and subsidiary companies of the 
company issuing the shares, shareholder approval is generally required. Under 
Section 48, the conditions under which a company may acquire shares in its holding 
company are strictly regulated. The Act further prohibits a company from directly or 
indirectly paying any fine on behalf of a director of the company or of its holding or 
subsidiary company who has been convicted of an offence in terms of any law.227 
And finally, Section 95 requires that in certain circumstances, where a company 
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offers to holders of the company’s securities securities in the company of any other 
company within the group of companies, a prospectus is required.228 
 
Although these provisions can provide protection to minority shareholders and 
creditors, involuntary creditors such as delictual claimants do not benefit from these 
protective measures.229  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, it has been argued that legislative intervention implies a 
general tendency that separate legal personalities of companies within a group may 
be more easily disregarded. However, the better view is still that legislative 
recognition that a group of companies may constitute a single economic entity does 
not imply a general tendency towards treating groups of companies as a single 
entity.230 Legislative intervention can rather be attributed to the fact that company 
law had to be developed to address some of the concerns with group structures.231  
 
It is accepted that ‘save [for] where the wording or purpose of a particular statute or 
contract justifies the treatment of a holding company and a subsidiary as one 
corporate entity the mere fact that a group of companies constitutes a single 
economic unit does not in itself justify the treatment of the group as a single 
entity.’232 Cassim concludes that the fact that the legislature only in specific 
instances introduced single economic rules to apply to groups can only mean that 
the legislature found that only in those circumstances would it be necessary to 
consider the group as a whole.233  
 
The above interventions addressed the need for increased transparency. Even when 
these provisions are complied with, the separate legal personalities of the 
companies remain intact. Transparency may however serve to deter those in control 
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of the company from abusing the separate legal personalities of individual 
companies within a group. 
 
Ex PARTE GORE: FACTS OF THE CASE 
 
In the case of Ex parte Gore234 the court for the first time considered an application 
for piercing of the corporate veil under section 20(9) of the Act. Although section 
20(9) does not find specific application to company groups, the relief sought was to 
pierce the corporate veil within a group of companies. The case therefore provides 
insight into the possible impact that Section 20(9) may have on group enterprises. 
 
The applicants in this case were the liquidators of one or more companies forming 
part of a group of companies, referred to as the King Group.  The group’s holding 
company was King Finance Holdings Limited (‘KFH’), which was also in liquidation. 
The majority of KFH’s shares were held by the King brothers through family trusts. 
The three brothers were directors of KFH and most of its subsidiaries and at all 
times exercised control over the group.  
 
Although only one company within the group, King Services (Pty) Ltd, was a 
licensed financial service provider, the group was used to conduct the business of a 
financial services provider by way of investment in commercial and residential 
immovable properties. Investments were structured in the form of a share purchase 
agreement, where the investor would purchase shares in one of the companies 
within the group. The purchase of the shares was coupled with a loan to the 
company in which the investor was purchasing shares.  Investigations into the group 
established that the King brothers operated the business as if it was only the holding 
company. Loans made to subsidiaries were allocated by the controllers to any 
member of the company with no regard to the individual identity of the company and 
with grossly inadequate recordkeeping. The flow of funds seemed to have been 
based on a need for the King brothers to sustain the scheme by allocating loans to 
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any company requiring money to pay out investors who wanted to withdraw their 
investments. The group also contravened other provisions of the Act by inter alia 
offering shares in a private company to the public and issuing unauthorised shares. 
 
As a result of the dishonest and chaotic administration of the affairs of the group, the 
liquidators of the companies were not able to identify the actual entities within the 
group against which the individual investors held a claim.  They therefore applied to 
the court to pierce the corporate veil between the holding company and its 
subsidiaries in order to treat the assets of the group as the assets of the holding 
company for purposes of the investors’ claims.235 The application was brought under 
the common law, alternatively in terms of section 20(9) of the Act.   
 
On the facts it was clear that the controllers in effect operated the whole group as 
one entity through the holding company.236 For practical purposes the King brothers 
made no distinction when it came to dealing with investors’ funds between KFH and 
the subsidiary companies.237 The court found that this disregard by the controllers of 
the separate legal personalities of the individual companies in the King Group was 
so extensive that the group was in fact a ‘sham’.238 The court found this to be an 
unconscionable abuse by the controllers of the separate legal personalities of the 
subsidiaries of the group and the case was accordingly brought within the ambit of 
s 20(9).239 The court ordered that the subsidiaries in the King Group not be deemed 
to be juristic persons in respect of any obligations they had to investors in the King 
Group and their shareholder, the holding company, therefore be treated as the only 
company within the group.240 
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MEANING OF ‘UNCONSCIONABLE ABUSE’ 
 
Section 20(9) determines that the court may pierce the corporate veil if the 
incorporation of a company, the use of a company or any act by or on behalf of the 
company, constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of the 
company as a separate entity. Before a court can therefore consider exercising its 
discretion in favour of piercing the corporate veil,241 it must be found that there had 
been an unconscionable abuse of the separate juristic personality of the company in 
question.  
 
Interpreting by reference to the Interpretation provisions of the Act: 
 
Section 20(9) is not specific as to what would constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’. The 
court in Ex parte Gore242 points out that the Act needs to be interpreted with 
reference to section 7 of the Act, read together with section 5 of the Act. Section 5(1) 
of the Act requires the Act to be interpreted and applied in a manner that gives effect 
to the purposes set out in section 7 of the Act. Section 7 sets out very broad 
purposed; such as to promote the development of the South African economy,243 to 
promote innovation and investment in the South African markets,244 and to reaffirm 
the concept of the company as a means of achieving economic and social 
benefits.245  
 
Cassim criticises these provisions and states that whilst the objective of the Act may 
be properly expanded on in a policy document, it becomes problematic when such 
broad objectives are inserted in the Act itself.246 It is difficult to determine how 
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exactly the court should give effect to such wide objectives.247 In the DTI Policy 
Document,248 it is however emphasised that the new Act is not intended to jettison 
unreasonably the body of corporate jurisprudence built up over more than a 
century.249 Where the current law meets these objectives, it should remain part of 
the future company law regime.250 Cassim states this to be a conservative middle-
path approach and that it will cause difficulties and conflict throughout the Act in 
blending the old with the new philosophical trends in modern company law.251 In Ex 
Parte Gore,252 the court found there not to be any conflict between the common law 
remedy and the new statutory remedy for piercing the corporate veil.253 In the case 
of section 20(9) of the Act, it should therefore not be problematic to blend the 
position before its introduction with the position thereafter. The broad purposes set 
out in Section 7 of the Act do however not provide assistance to the courts when 
interpreting the meaning of the words ‘unconscionable abuse’. 
 
Interpreting by reference to similar provisions in other legislation: 
 
Academics254 suggest that in interpreting the meaning of ‘unconscionable abuse’ 
one should turn to the courts’ interpretation of section 65 of the Close Corporations 
Act255 as this section contains a similarly worded provision. Section 65 of the Close 
Corporations Act reads as follows: 
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‘Whenever a Court on application by an interested person, or in any 
proceeding in which a corporation is involved, finds that the incorporation of, 
or any act by or on behalf of, or any use of, that corporation, constitutes a 
gross abuse of the juristic personality of the corporation as a separate entity, 
the Court may declare that the corporation is to be deemed not to be a juristic 
person in respect of such rights, obligation or liabilities of the corporation, or 
of such member or members thereof, or of such other person or persons, as 
are specified in the declaration, and the Court may give such further order or 
orders as it may deem fit in order to give effect to such declaration.’ 
 
In Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim256  the court, in relation to section 65, 
states that: 
 
‘Liability under this section depends on a finding of "gross abuse of the juristic 
personality of the corporation as a separate entity". However, no attempt has 
been made in the section to indicate the facts or circumstances that would 
qualify as a gross abuse of the juristic personality of the corporation as a 
separate entity. The courts are required, in other words, to give content to the 
open-ended concept of "gross abuse", based on the facts of each particular 
case. This exercise does not take place in a vacuum, however, and it is 
axiomatic that the principles and categories developed with regard to piercing 
the corporate veil in the context of company law will serve as useful 
guidelines in this context. 
 
The starting point is that veil piercing will be employed "only where special 
circumstances exist indicating that it (i.e. the company or close corporation) 
is a mere façade concealing the true facts". Fraud will obviously be such a 
special circumstance, but it is not essential. In certain circumstances, the 
corporate veil will also be pierced "where the controlling shareholders do not 
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treat the company as a separate entity, but instead treat it as their “alter ego” 
or “instrumentality” to promote their private, extra-corporate interests’257 
 
In this case, the court concluded that due to the legislature not specifically providing 
for the type of conduct that would constitute gross abuse, the courts need to turn the 
common law remedy for piercing the corporate veil to find what conduct would 
constitute gross abuse. 
 
In Ex Parte Gore258 the court notes that there is a difference between section 20(9) 
of the Act and section 65 of the Close Corporation Act in the description of the 
abuse.259 In terms of the section 65 of the Close Corporations Act the separate legal 
personality of a corporation would be pierced in instances of a ‘gross abuse’ of the 
corporation’s separate legal personality, whereas under section 20(9) of the Act the 
separate legal personality of a company will be pierced in instances of 
‘unconscionable abuse’ of its separate legal personality.  The court finds that the 
term ‘unconscionable abuse’ is less extreme than the term ‘gross abuse’.260 The 
court gave no specific reasons as to why it found that the word ‘gross’ sets a more 
stringent test than the word ‘unconscionable’. However, if this approach is to be 
followed, by casting a net wider, it can at least be said that the type of conduct which 
the courts held to be a gross abuse of the separate legal personality of a closed 
corporations under section 65 of the Close Corporations Act would also constitute 
conduct which will constitute an unconscionably abuse under section 20(9).  
 
In Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim261 it was held that conducting the 
business of the various closed corporations (incorporated by family members) with 
scant regard to the separate legal personality of the individual corporate entities 
constitute a gross abuse of the corporate personality of all of the entities.262  
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Further circumstances which the courts have considered to constituted a gross 
abuse of a corporation’s separate legal personality was, for example, in Haygro 
Catering CC v Van der Merwe263 and TJ Jonck CC t/a Bothaville Vleismark v Du 
Plessis NO.264 In Haygro Catering CC v Van der Merwe265 the court held that the 
members of the corporation were liable for the debts of the corporation where the 
corporation failed to display the name of the corporation at its business premises 
and on its other documents and correspondence as is required in terms of section 
23 of the Close Corporations Act.266 The display of the corporation details would 
have alerted creditors to the separate legal personality of the business; and the 
limited liability of the owners of the business. The court found that the failure to 
display the name of the corporation constituted a gross abuse of the separate legal 
personality of the corporation under section 65 of the Close Corporations Act.267 
 
In TJ Jonck CC t/a Bothaville Vleismark v Du Plessis NO,268 a member of a 
corporation made a number of large loans to a corporation knowing that the 
corporation was insolvent and would not be able to pay back the loans. He also 
authorised the registration of a notarial bond over the movable property, equipment 
and stock, of the corporation as security for his loans. When the corporation fell into 
default on the loan, he attached the corporation’s equipment and stock in terms of 
the notarial bond. Thereafter, he continued to conduct the business of the 
corporation from the same premises, just under a new name, using the equipment 
and stock of the corporation. The court held the member personally liable for the 
debt of the corporation under section 64 of the Close Corporations Act269 as he had 
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been conducting the business of the corporation fraudulently or recklessly.270 
However, the court also observed that the actions of the member had constituted 
gross abuse of the separate legal personality of the corporation as envisaged in 
section 65 of the Close Corporations Act.271 
 
This type of conduct may therefore also be considered an unconscionable abuse of 
the separate juristic personality of a company. 
 
Common law 
 
A preliminary question is whether the introduction of the statutory provision for 
piercing the corporate veil repealed the common law remedy for piercing the 
corporate veil. The legislature gave no express intention, as was done in section 
165(1)272 of the Act, to indicate that that was the intention.273 However, the 
legislature also does not give an express indication that it was not the intention to 
replace the common law, as was done in section 161(2) of the Act.274 The court in 
Ex Parte Gore275 concludes that section 20(9) is rather supplemental than 
substitutive of the common law.276  
 
In Ex Parte Gore277 the court did however find that the statutory remedy for piercing 
the corporate veil in section 20(9) of the Act differs in some respects to the common 
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law remedy of piercing the corporate veil.278 The court states that the term 
‘unconscionable abuse’ ‘postulates conduct in relation to the formation and use of 
companies diverse enough to cover all the descriptive terms like “sham”, “device”, 
“stratagem” and the like used in that connection in the earlier cases…’279  
 
The circumstances under which the courts held that a company was a sham or 
merely a façade and pierced the corporate veil under the common law would also 
constitutive conduct which can be seen as unconscionable abuse of the separate 
legal personality of a company. The term ‘unconscionable abuse’ can however also 
include a broader variety of conduct and is not limited to such conduct which justified 
piercing under the common law.280 The court considered the wide language of 
section 20(9) as indicative of the legislature’s appreciation of the fact that this 
provision might find application in widely varying factual circumstances.281  It 
concludes that section 20(9) had broadened the basis upon which the courts in 
South Africa would be prepared to disregard the separate legal personalities of 
companies.282 
 
In coming to this conclusion, the court looked at the current common law approach, 
and with specific regard given to the approach followed in the English courts.283 
According to the court in Hashem v Shayif284 the impropriety must be a linked to the 
use of the company structure to avoid or conceal liability; and that it is necessary to 
show both control of the company by the wrongdoer and impropriety in the sense of 
a misuse of the company as a device or façade to conceal wrongdoing.285 The court 
in Ex Party Gore286 found that it would have been difficult to justify disregarding the 
separate legal personalities in the case of the Kings group as in this case it was not 
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apparent that the improprieties in dealing with investor’s funds were so done to 
conceal the true facts.287 The facts in Ex Parte Gore288 should be distinguished from 
the facts in the Hashem v Shayif289 in that within the King Group, the separate legal 
personality of the companies within the group was not as such abused to conceal 
the improprieties, it was rather ignored.290 In Ex Parte Gore,291 the separate 
personas of the companies were not used to conceal wrongdoing.292 
 
This finding of the court seems to be in conflict with the court’s approach in Airport 
Cold Storage v Ebrahim.293 In the later case, the court stated that ‘[t]he starting point 
is that veil piercing will be employed ‘only where special circumstances exist 
indication that it [the juristic entity] is a mere façade concealing the true facts’.294 
Fraud will obviously be such a special circumstance, but it is not essential.295 In 
certain circumstance, the corporate veil will also be pierced ‘where the controlling 
shareholders do not treat the company as a separate entity, but instead treat is as 
their “alter ego” or “instrumentality” to promote their private, extra corporate 
interest.’296 When applying this approach to the fact in Ex Parte Gore,297 it may be 
said that the holding company treated its subsidiaries’ business as if it was the 
business of the holding company. The subsidiaries within the group were the alter 
egos of the holding company and were used to promote its business. Even with no 
intention to defraud or conceal the facts, there was no separation of the business of 
the subsidiaries and the holding company. The subsidiaries were merely alter egos 
of the holding company and instrumentally used to promote the interest of the 
holding company.  
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Stevens298 argues that Section 20(9) allows piercing on a narrower basis when 
compared to the common law.299 He finds that compared to the flexible approach set 
out in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments300  ‘[t]he statutory test [of 
proving an unconscionable abuse] would, had it not been for the common law test, 
have made it more difficult to pierce the corporate veil.’301 Under the common law, 
the courts have always steered away from setting rigid rules. This resulted therein 
that under the common law there are no fixed categories or principles that must be 
present when the court pierced the corporate veil.302 Given this flexibility under the 
common law remedy, it seems doubtful that the Section 20(9) broadened the basis 
of the common law remedy.  
 
Similar concerns have been raised with regards to two provisions in the Chinese 
Companies Act.303 The Chinese legislature in 2006 introduced a statutory remedy 
for piercing of the corporate veil.  Article 20 of the Chinese Companies Act304 
determines that:  
 
‘Where any of the shareholders of a company evades the payment of its 
debts by abusing the independent status of juridical persons or the 
shareholder's limited liabilities, and thus seriously damages the interests of 
any creditors, it shall bear joint liabilities for the debts of the company.’  
 
Art 64 of the Chinese Companies Act,305 which applies to limited liability companies 
with a single shareholder, determines that:   
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‘If the shareholder of a one-person limited liability company is unable to prove 
that the property of the one-person limited liability company is independent 
from his own property, he shall bear joint liabilities for the debts of the 
company.’ 
 
Wu306 criticises the shortfalls of these statutory piercing provisions. He states that 
the provisions do not provide sufficient guidance to the courts as to how they should 
proceed with analysing a case where veil piercing is sought. He further states that 
the scope of the provisions is unclear, or alternatively too narrow. These 
shortcomings mean that the uncertainty remains for shareholders, as well as 
creditors. In addition, these provisions may have brought uncertainty to the courts 
as to how far their powers with regards to piercing stretch as the court may consider 
themselves bound to only pierce where the requirements of Section 20 and/or 
Section 63 have been met.307 
 
Wu’s criticism of the Chinese Company Law is equally applicable to section 20(9) of 
the Act. Section 20(9) fails to identify the conduct which constitutes unconscionable 
abuse of the separate legal personality of a company. The type of conduct which 
will lead to piercing therefore remains open for interpretation. When compared to 
the position under the common law, no more certainty has therefore been 
established as to when the courts will pierce the corporate veil. 
 
A further complication under Section 20(9) of the Act is that, even where it was 
found that there was an unconscionable abuse of the separate legal personality of a 
company, the court still has discretion to provide relief under this section. Section 
20(9) determines that the court ‘may’ make a declaration that the company is not to 
be deemed a juristic person in respect of any right, obligation or liability of the 
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company. According to Schoeman308 the use of the word ‘may’ in this section 
denotes that the court has an discretion whether or not to pierce the corporate veil, 
in addition to making any order to enforce the piercing of the corporate veil.309 The 
legislature did not, complimentary to section 20(9), indicate factors that the court 
should consider in exercising its discretion to pierce the corporate veil. To this 
extent, section 20(9) has not deviated from the common law position under which 
the court considered each application on its own facts.310  
 
A discretionary decision would require the court to look at the facts presented in 
each case. So, for example, the court in exercising its discretion under section 81 of 
the Act, with regards to an application for winding up of a solvent company, must be 
exercised on judicial grounds and the court should have regard to the fact of the 
case before it.311 Past decision on the circumstances under which the court 
favourably exercised this discretion, can serve as guidelines.312 Similarly, when 
exercising their discretion under Section 20(9), the courts should consider past 
decisions where the courts decided to pierce the corporate veil. As the statutory 
remedy for piercing the corporate veil is a new remedy, it is likely that decisions 
under common law will play an important role.313 
 
Evaluation 
 
On analysis of the statutory remedy for piercing the corporate veil, it reveals that it 
remains uncertain when the remedy is available and determining which type of 
conduct should result in piercing the veil remains open to interpretation by the 
courts. The statutory remedy does not clarify the uncertainty for which the common 
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law remedy is critised. It follows that, where the statutory remedy under section 
20(9) does not contain factors that would lead to piercing, the remedy also does not 
make provision therefore that when it comes to piercing the veil between company 
groups, different policy considerations come into play.  
 
PIERCING NO LONGER AN EXCEPTIONAL REMEDY? 
 
In Ex parte Gore314 the court states that section 20(9) has brought about the 
situation where piercing the corporate veil should no longer be regarded to be an 
exceptional or drastic remedy; one which should not be granted only because it is 
just or convenient to do so.315  The court states that section 20(9) affords a ‘firm, 
albeit flexibly defined’ basis for piercing the corporate veil.316 This basis erodes the 
foundation of the view held under common law that piercing the corporate veil 
should be approach with great reservation.317 The courts states that ‘[b]y expressly 
establishing its availability simply when the facts of the case justify it, the provision 
detracts from the notion that the remedy should be regarded as exceptional, or 
drastic.’318  
 
Under common law, one of the policy considerations weighing against making an 
order to pierce the corporate veil is that separate legal personality is bestowed on a 
company by the legislature. By introducing a statutory remedy for piercing the 
corporate veil, the legislature indicates that it does not consider the veil of 
incorporation to be impenetrable.  
 
This again, differs from the approach the court followed in Airport Cold Storage v 
Ebrahim.319 In Airport Cold Storage v Ebrahim,320 the court still regarded the remedy 
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for piercing the corporate veil to be exceptional321 and relied on past reasoning 
under the common law in coming to a decision to pierce the corporate veil under 
section 65 of the Close Corporation Act.322 It remains to be seen, given the courts’ 
discretion to grant a remedy in terms of section 20(9), whether the courts will follow 
the liberal approach in Ex parte Gore323 or the more conservative approach in Airport 
Cold Storage v Ebrahim.324 
 
PIERCING AS A REMEDY OF LAST RESORT 
 
Although under the common law, and as was discussed in Chapter 3, the position 
had not always been clear whether piercing the corporate veil may be done where 
the plaintiff has other remedies to his or her aid, the introduction of section 20(9) 
may have brought about some clarity on this matter. 
 
In Ex parte Gore,325 the court states that the unqualified availability of the remedy in 
terms of section 20(9) militates against an approach that piercing the corporate veil 
should only be granted in absence of an alternative remedy.326 
 
Although, under common law some argued that piercing the corporate veil should 
only be granted as a last resort remedy,327 the preferred approach is that the 
existence of an alternative remedy should no preclude an order for piercing of the 
corporate veil.328 The existence of another remedy, or the failure to pursue one that 
was available, is however a relevant factor where policy considerations are being 
weighed up.329  
 
                                                           
321
 Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim supra (n 254) at 21. 
322
 Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim supra (n 254) at 24. 
323
 Ex Parte Gore NNO supra (n 10). 
324
 Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim supra (n 254). 
325
 Ex Parte Gore NNO supra (n 10). 
326
 Ex Parte Gore NNO supra (n 10) at 34. 
327
 See for example Hulse-Reutter v Godde supra (n 141). 
328
 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd supra (n 123). 
329
 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd supra (n 123) at 38. 
72 
 
The introduction of Section 20(9) may bring about a more liberal approach where the 
courts no longer weigh against a plaintiff the fact that he or she has another remedy 
available to him or her. Section 20(9) however does not direct the court with regards 
to factors it must or must not consider when exercising its jurisdiction. And it may be 
that the courts will still consider the availability of another remedy in exercising their 
discretion.   
 
WHO MAY INVOKE SECTION 20(9)? 
 
Interested person 
 
Section 20(9) determines that ‘an interested’ person may invoke this provision. 
According to the court in Ex Parte Gore,330 there is no mystique attached to the 
meaning of this term.331 The locus standi of a person seeking to make an application 
in terms of section 20(9) should be determined by the well-established principles, as 
stated in Jacobs en ‘n Ander v Waks en Andere,332 and where related to a right in 
the Bill of Rights, section 38 of the Constitution.333   
 
Mero moto 
 
In National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Lee Electronics (Pty) Ltd,334 the 
Labour Court of Appeal was requested to pierce the corporate veil between a group 
of companies in order for it to be considered that a member of the applicant union 
would be regarded to be an employee of the third respondent. The first and second 
respondents both manufactured and distributed radios and television sets, and both 
companies were wholly owned by the third respondent. The applicant contended 
that after the first responded closed its business and dismissed its employees; the 
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first respondent’s business was secretly continued by the second respondent. The 
second respondent thereafter selectively reemployed individual employees once 
working for the first respondent. The appellants argued that by virtue of the third 
respondent’s controlling interest in the first and second respondents, the third 
respondent was at all material times the employer of all the employees of the group. 
Through closing the first respondent, the third responded attempted to subvert the 
employee’s labour rights. 
 
The Court noted that this case gave rise to the question as to when the corporate 
veil of companies may be pierced. Referring to the section 20(9), the court states 
that if it finds that the incorporation of a company constitutes an unconscionable 
abuse of its juristic personality, it may declare the company not to be a juristic 
person in respect of any right, obligation or liability and make any order deemed 
necessary. The court however found that the applicant in the case seemed not to 
have relied on this provision, but rather on the common law, and therefore it was 
unable to make a finding based on section 20(9). On the facts, the court found that 
no evidence was presented that the first respondent’s business had transferred to 
the second respondent and held that the third respondent therefore had not abused 
the corporate entities of the two companies. 
 
It is submitted that the court erred in finding that it was not able to consider providing 
relief under section 20(9). Under section 20(9), the court may in proceeding before 
invoke relief under section 20(9), and was able to do so mero moto.335 
 
The court’s reliance on the common law in this case may be indicative thereof that 
the courts will rely on the case law developed under the common law and may turn 
to the common law, notwithstanding that section 20(9) provides a legislative 
mechanism to pierce the corporate veil. 
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ORDER THAT THE COURT MAY MAKE 
 
The court may declare a company not to be a juristic person in respect of certain 
rights, obligations or liabilities of the company, or of a shareholder of the company, 
or in the case of a non-profit company, a member of the company or of another 
person specified in the declaration.336  Such a declaration was made in Ex Parte 
Gore,337 where the court found that all the subsidiary companies should be deemed 
not to be juristic persons in respect of any obligation by such companies to the 
investors.338  
 
According to Cassim, a court does not have the power to intervene under section 
20(9) where the unconscionable abuse is not in respect of any such right, obligation 
or liability.339 Cassim argues that there must be a nexus between the abusive 
conduct and right, obligation or liability incurred by the company as a result of such 
conduct.340  
 
Ex parte Gore341 the court stated that paragraph 20(9)(b) affords the court the very 
widest powers to grant consequential relief.342 The order made under section 
20(9)(b) should however always have the effect of fixing the right, obligation or 
liability in issue of the company somewhere else.343 In Ex parte Gore344 the courts, 
after declaring that all the companies in the King Group was to be regarded as one 
single entity, consequently made an order that all assets of the subsidiaries should 
be transferred into one account and investors should be called to submit claims 
against the single entity and not against individual subsidiaries.345 
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SUMMARY  
 
From the above analysis is seems clear that section 20(9) cannot be considered to 
have improved on that for which the common law remedy had been critisised. Whilst 
in Ex parte Gore346 the court may have stated that the statutory remedy for piercing 
the corporate veil is an extension of the common law, the common law had never 
been developed to specify circumstances under which the corporate veil will be 
pierced.347 The courts have always guarded against setting such rigid rules.  
 
It may prove that the flexibility that section 20(9) allows for is preferable. The 
flexibility ensures that the remedy can be applied and developed to find application 
as required in the interest of justice. 
 
Section 20(9) has been used by the court to pierce the corporate veil between 
companies within a group in the Ex Parte Gore348 case. Section 20(9) did however 
not improve the common law remedy for piercing the corporate veil. Also within the 
group context, section 20(9) does not address the concerns that have been raised in 
groups of companies.  
 
The South African company law in this regard therefore does not provide specific 
mechanisms to address concerns that are specific to groups. Although the 
legislature has introduced some group specific regulation, these do not point to the 
legislature’s intention to treat company groups as single entities. By introducing 
section 20(9) as a statutory remedy which enables plaintiffs to pierce the corporate 
veil, although applicable also to pierce the veil within company groups, the 
legislature has not addresses those concerns that are unique to company groups. 
As a remedy, it has also not improved the position as has existed under the common 
law.  
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CHAPTER 5: FINAL EVALUATION 
The limited liability of the shareholders of companies has been essential to economic 
development. It enabled fundraising from the public without exposing the investors to 
unlimited risks and claims if the venture funded did not succeed. A review of the history 
of limited liability reveals however that it preceded the company group. When company 
law started enabling a company to hold shares in another company, the limited liability 
of the holding company occurred almost incidental. No thought went into the clearly 
different policy and economic considerations that exist in the context of a group of 
companies. The limitation of the liability of a holding company brought about that the 
shareholders of the holding company have two layers of protection from claims by the 
subsidiary company’s creditors.  The holding company will however have control over 
its subsidiary and all the economic benefits will be enjoyed by the group as a whole. 
A prominent concern with the separate legal personality of a company and the limited 
liability of shareholders is that it can be abused by those in control of the company. 
Shareholders’ investments are protected from the company’s creditors, but they are 
also able through exercising control to insist on returns on their investments, leaving the 
company undercapitalised and unable to pay its creditors. 
The common law remedy for piercing the corporate veil enables the court to provide 
relief where there was an abuse of the separate legal personality of the company in this 
manner. The courts are however conservative in affording relief under this remedy, as 
the separate legal personality of the company is seen to lie at the heart of company law. 
Within company groups, although briefly the courts seemed to recognise the unique 
economic relationship between a holding company and its subsidiaries, the courts have 
strictly upheld the separate legal personality of individual companies within a group. 
When piercing the veil between companies in groups, the courts have not developed 
rules unique to this relationship. The courts have never specified the exact requirements 
for providing relief, resulting therein that this remedy is expensive to litigate and 
investors uncertain of the durability of their limited liability.  
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The statutory remedy for piercing the corporate veil, similar to the common law remedy, 
did not create more certainty as to the type of conduct that would enable the court to 
hold the shareholders of a company liable for the company’s obligations. The wording of 
this section is likely to be interpreted in line with common law decisions on which type of 
conduct would justify relief. As a result, it is doubtful that the courts will approach 
statutory veil piercing between company groups differently. 
The South African company law landscape does not provide a remedy to address 
concerns that are specific to company groups. Addressing abuses of the separate legal 
personality of subsidiary companies within groups therefore remain problematic. 
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